

1942
British Embassy, Bagdad.

No.: 152

PART FIVE

Name of File:—

FROM 166 -

IRAN KURDS

(No minutes to be written here.)

LAST Year's File No.: ✓

(16)

NEXT Year's File No.: 155

Iran : Kurds.

152/166/42

Copy to Mr. Edmonds

(152/166/42)

23rd July 1942.

W.A. Lyon

I enclose a copy of Tehran telegram No.258 of July 16th and of the Ambassador's reply.

2. Edmonds is trying to have a message conveyed to Mahmud Khan that if he provokes a quarrel with the Jaf he will incur Iraqi displeasure and the Ambassador suggests that if you yourself happen to see anyone who is likely to come in contact with Mahmud Khan you could speak of the Jaf and, while avoiding giving the impression that you are doing so under instructions, you could let it be known that if Mahmud Khan provokes trouble with the tribe he will also become unpopular with the British authorities.

W.A. Lyon

W.A. Lyon

LIEUT. COLONEL W.A. LYON O. B. E.

INDEX

Paraphrased

VH
Rk
Am

152

No. 96(144/244/42)

Iran: Kurds 152/191/42 ✓

HIS Majesty's Minister at Tehran
~~KABASSADOR~~ ~~BAGDAD~~
presents his compliments to the Ambassador
and has the honour to transmit to him the ~~un~~ documents.



British.....Embassy.....
.....Bagdad.....

28th..October1942....

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Copy of Tehran despatch to the Foreign Office No. 363 dated 28th October and enclosures	Internal situation in Azerbaijan.
<div>Edmund</div> <div>CR 2/11</div> <div>Col. Wood</div> <div>and returns.</div> <div>Admir. Thi</div> <div>311</div> <div>INDEX</div>	

British Legation,

Tehran.

363
No. (144/244/42.)

28th October, 1942.

Sir,

59/S (faded)

With reference to Tabriz telegram No. 164 (repeated to the Foreign Office as Tabriz telegram No. 54) regarding the situation in Azerbaijan, I have the honour to enclose here copies of the following documents:-

- (1) Translation of an aide-mémoire from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs dated 26th September, 1942, concerning the Kurds in Azerbaijan,
- (2) Mr. Consul-General Urquhart's comments on (1) in the form of a telegram dated 9th October, and
- (3) A translation of a further aide-mémoire from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs dated 20th October.
Mr. Urquhart's observations on (3) have been requested but have not yet arrived.

Not read
2. It will be seen that the situation in Western Azerbaijan is far from clear. The version of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which is set forth in (1) differs considerably from the views of the Persian Governor-General at Tabriz and of the Russians with whom Mr. Urquhart is in contact. The Russians say that they have been working with the Persians, and that the Kurdish leaders who were summoned to Ushnu early in September were warned not to create disorders. The Persian version, supported by evidence from Kurdish sources, see Tabriz telegram No. 49 of the 18th September, is that the Kurds were asked to swear to support the Soviet authorities and to form a united Kurdish front. Enclosure (3) gives a good deal of detail about various rumours which are in circulation concerning what the Persian authorities regard as a revolutionary movement, supported or at any rate not discouraged by the Russians, for an autonomous Kurdistan.

3. The position is, I think, genuinely complicated. The Russians mistrust the Persians and do not want large Persian forces in this difficult area. They were, however, greatly embarrassed when the Kurds got out of hand in the Rezaieh district last summer and are probably anxious also to re-establish order on the frontier and to make the smuggling of wheat into Turkey more difficult. The Persians are, however, unable to keep order unless their forces can go into the district; and the Russians are evidently unwilling to police the district themselves. So they have compounded with the Kurds by endeavouring to enable reasonably responsible chiefs to keep order among the tribesmen. Whether the Kurdish chiefs have really started to use their own flag or not, I cannot say; but they must inevitably be encouraged, by this authoritative approval, in their vague dreams of autonomy, and we must expect some reaction in other parts of Kurdistan both in Iraq, Persia and even possibly in Turkey.

4. I realise that the above is mostly surmise, but no definite information is obtainable as to what Russian policy /towards

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, P.C., M.C., M.P.,
Etc., Etc., Etc.,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

towards the Kurds really is. I doubt whether the Russians have any clear long-range plans at all; they seem for the most part to follow a hand-to-mouth policy in Persia and to treat problems as they arise in accordance with the exigencies of the war situation. There are, however, signs that they wish to have a body of united Kurds under Russian influence. At the same time they no doubt want the Kurds to be orderly, as pillaging of Persians by Kurds under Russian influence would make the Russians very unpopular.

5. Mr. Urquhart has also referred to me recently a rumour concerning a meeting said to have taken place in Persian Kurdistan between Colonel Lyon, an officer serving in Iraq, and certain Kurds, together with other reports concerning a certain officer named Jackman. A reference to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad has shown that those reports were quite untrue and that Jackman does not exist, but it is evident that when the Ministry refer to "foreign officials" they really mean British officials as well as Russians.

6. Meanwhile the news from Rezaieh is not alarming: a Persian official named Ibtihaj es Sultan, who was recently there reports that Kurds entering the town are being disarmed on entry, in order that clashes with Persian troops should not take place. But it is clear that the Persian Government have no control over large areas of Kurdistan. They can be trusted to do their best to play, as much as they can, the game which they know so well, of playing off one Kurd against another, but meanwhile they remain intensely suspicious both of the Russians and (in much less degree) of the British authorities who have to deal with the Iraqi Kurds.

~~I have the honour~~

7. I am sending copies of this despatch and of its enclosures to the Office of the Minister of State in Cairo and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Bagdad and Ankara.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

(Signed) R.W. BULLARD.

From : M.F.A.

To : H.M. Legation.

Date 4th Mehr 1321.
26th Sept. 1942.

Aide Memoire.

According to information received the following incidents have recently taken place among the Kurds in Azerbaijan.

The Chiefs of the Kurdish tribes gathered together at Mahabad, Ushnou and Rezaieh gathaxax tagathax and swore :

1. To be united.
2. To accept Omar Khan as their Chief.
3. To maintain their union against anybody who engages x treacherously against them or molests them.

Muhammed Rashid arrived at Mahabad on the 21st Shahrivar (12/9/42) and was elaborately received; shops were closed and the inhabitants went one farsakh (3 $\frac{3}{4}$ miles) outside the town and received him with shouts of 'Long live the Chief of the Kurdish tribes!' and an address was read out to him. From Tabriz and Rezaieh Russian officers also went to Mahabad by means of cars and had secret discussions with the chiefs of the Kurds, namely, Muhammed Rashid, Garaney Agha, Bayazid Agha Kurak and Fir Agha Mankur; and it is said that the Russian officials said to Mohammed Rashid as the Russian Government have supported the Kurds and desire that the Kurds should have independence and as the British Government have also recognised and honoured you we also will honour you and as you should be our ally and meantime any help needed will be granted to you. Muhammad Rashid also signed the letter signed by the Kurds by means of which Omar Khan is recognised as chief of the Kurds and then went to various places such as Khani Safa, Gelulan and Bahch and invited the Kurds to sign the agreement of union.

It is evident that, in view of these activities and the limitations of the authority of the Government and the difficulty of sending forces to prevent the activities of troublemaking Kurds and brigands, disorders and disturbances in these places will increase daily and there is the possibility of trouble spreading to other areas, and that in consequence the peace will be disturbed, the thread of affairs broken and responsibilities incurred. Therefore assistance to prevent such activities which are contrary to the treaty of collaboration and the principle of the country's independence is requested.

The Imperial M.F.A.

Sealed and dated 26/9/42.

T E L E G R A M.

From: Tabriz
No. 152

of 9/10/42.

Although Governor General stated yesterday that Russians were again reported as telling Kurds that if they persisted in creating disturbances they would be disarmed, I do not believe Russians have any intention of using force themselves.

2. The Governor General and other officials here have agreed with me that recent Russian moves make for order and strengthening of Persian control. To the evidence which you quote I would add recruitment of Gendarmes for service on Turkish Frontier, of customs posts at REZIAN, MAHABAD, SHEREEF KHANEN and perhaps at KHANEN before long. Governor General yesterday said that Russians were going to lend lorries to convoy from rail-head equipment now on the way from TEHRAN for the use of Persian force to be established here. Colonel MAHIN is now at MAKU with a force from REZIAN.

3. Governor General confirms that MOHAMMED RASHID went to MAHABAD to try to improve chaotic conditions now prevailing there. As for Colonel AMIR ASLANOFF'S conference with Kurds there, it is known he made MANGURS refund money stolen from an Iraqi merchant. Whilst indulging in usual dark hints fr (l.g.u.) agrees he probably told Kurds to disperse.

4. I agree that Russian lack of frankness has given cause for suspicion and Persians deserve our sympathy in view of their serious difficulties in Western Azerbaijan. Like them I have been puzzled by attempt to make Kurds unite, but I think Persians are wrong in interpreting it as directed against them. The sounder view I think is that Russians want to control unruly elements and hope to obtain it with a minimum of trouble by making (one or two) chiefs responsible.

5. M.F.A. memorandum does not represent views of any Iranian as expressed to me recently. It states facts inaccurately and last para. suggests Ministry's way of thinking lags behind the times. That manner of talking, which would not have been unreasonable in summer, is now out of date.

From : The MFA

To : H.M. Legation.

Date 28th Mehr 1321.
Equivalent date 20th Oct 1942.

Aide Memoire.

Following the aide memoire of the 2nd Mehr (24th Sept. 1942) information has been received in the MFA to the effect that Omar ~~imfr~~ Aqa Shakak, accompanied by 150 horsemen holding red flags marked with two crossed swords and 3 stars, have proceeded to Ushnuish where they have called together the Kurdish chiefs, and that while passing through Sulduz and other places they have collected funds and given instructions which point to their mischievous plans. Shakak's armed horsemen are freely moving in and around Regaiyeh and it appears that they are attempting gradually to establish themselves in the town and suddenly create a revolt, detain the Ustandar and the Chiefs of Offices and proclaim a Government of their own. It is understood that some of the Soviet civil and military regard these movements of theirs with the utmost complacency. This union of the Kurds is on the basis of a programme which they have been following since last month on the strength of a breath of favour from certain foreign authorities.

2. After Mohammed Rashid's return to Baneh, Seyid Afandi has made conversation with him and left for Panjvin to report. Mohammed Rashid has also been called back to Iraq, but is awaiting the return of the representatives whom he has sent to Naqdeh commission and to Ahmad Faruqi. After the termination of the Naqdeh commission Omar Khan with a number of foreign officers will proceed to Golulan and (there) resolutions will be adopted about Kurdistan. There is a rumour to the effect that irresponsible foreign agents have engaged in activities that will create difficulties for the Imperial Government.

3. A commission of the Kurds has been formed at Mahabad and it has been arranged for Omar Khan to review the horsemen gathered at Mahabad. Omar Khan, Ghafur Aqai Harki, Seyid Ghafur and Seyid Fattah his sons are favoured by foreign authorities and are representatives of Mohammed Rashid Javanmardi Gurk at Naqdeh.

4. A report has been heard that foreign authorities have promised Mohammed Rashid that they would clear up the position as regards Kurdistan. Mohammed Rashid has meanwhile accepted Omar Khan as Chief, and the areas of Saquez, Baneh, Sardasht, Gurk and southern areas have been put under his charge; and other foreign officials take part in the Naqdeh commission. The Kurds of Mahabad have taken an oath to assist Mohammed Rashid in the event of his starting operations.

5. On the request of Mohammed and Haji Qarehney Aqa, they have wrested authority from the Farnandar of Mahabad and the (Govt.) Depts. and the Kurds have taken an oath to carry out all the instructions of foreign officials, and believe that with the assistance of foreign officials they will be charged to organise the posts on the Turkish frontier line.

6. It is said that Qarehney Aqa has offered to Ahmad Faruqi the post of the Bakhshdar of Miandub and has sought Mohammed Rashid's instructions, and the latter has given a definite promise to agree to this arrangement. As such machinations and activities by the Kurds jeopardise the country's security which it is for the Govt. to establish and as the assistance and concurrence of the foreign officials stir up the Kurds and encourages them to disobey the law of the land, and as such interference by the said officials in the internal affairs of the country is contrary to the tri-partite treaty and detrimental to the country's independence, the MFA expects that urgent and effective consideration will be given to this matter, that these activities will be prevented by immediate measures and that the MFA may be informed of the result as soon as possible.

Seal of the MFA

T

Iran: Kurds 152/190/42.

SECRET.



Combined Intelligence Centre 'Iraq,
Baghdad.

Reference:-
DO/TP/1/6/A.

27th October, 1942.

Dear Lyon

152 }
188 }
42 } Thank you for your C/2/947 of October 22nd.

The statement to which you take exception - and I agree that it is rather strong - was lifted verbatim from a report by H.M.Consul-General, Tabriz. His criticism refers to the Kurds of Azerbaijan and you will have noted that our extract appears under that heading and that particular reference is made in the context to the Kurds of that area.

2. I allowed the criticism to be published as I gather the impression that romantic ideas about the Kurds are still fairly general and a jolt in the opposite direction, in my opinion, is not a bad thing at the present moment. If, however, you think the statement is too sweeping and if you care to state your own views in your next report of which we receive a copy, I shall be glad to be allowed to give them the same publicity.

Yours sincerely *Edmonds*

Lt.Colonel W.A.Lyon, O.B.E.,
Political Adviser,
Kirkuk.

Copy to :-

Captain V.Holt, C.M.G., M.V.O. ✓
C.J.Edmonds Esq., C.M.G., C.B.E.,

54

52.
Iran: Kurds

152/189/42.

SECRET.

No. C/2/954.

Political Adviser's Office,
Northern Area,
Kirkuk, 25th. October, 1942.

Dear Wood,

152/188/42 }

In continuation of my C/2/947 of
22nd October 1942, I send you as a matter of
interest copy of a letter dated 24th October
received by me from Heron of the Ministry of
Economics. *What a contrast!*

Yours sincerely,

Ad Cym

Lieut. Colonel E.K. Wood,
Head of Centre, C.I.C.I.,
Baghdad.

MA 28/10

Copy to:-

C.J. Edmonds, Esq., C.M.G., C.B.E.

Captain V. Holt, C.M.G., C.V.O. ✓

INDEX



(Copy)

MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS, BAGHDAD,

24th October, 1942.

Dear Colonel Lyon,

I am sorry I did not have time to call on you when I passed through Kirkuk on my return here after completing Liwa Sulaimaniya. I hope to return in April next year to the Liwa Arbil.

My 4½ months in the Kurdish hills were very pleasant. In 55 years of this sort of thing, I have never had such intelligent assistance from local officials and notables, down to the youngest policeman and humblest villager.

I was much impressed by the courtesy of everyone, and of course Kurdish hospitality is charming.

Much of this happy environment was due to your introduction to the Mutasarrif and I thank you.

I hope to see you next year.

Sincerely yours,

Sd/- A. Heron.

152
Robert Anderson
What this means

Iran : Kurds

152/188/42

No. C/2/947.

Political Adviser's Office,
Northern Area,
Iraq, 22nd. October, 1942.

SECRET.

Dear Wood,



I would be interested to know the source of the extra-ordinary one sided offensive and un-British statement in para. 45 of Summary 88 for week ending 18th October 1942. If it is true then the Kurds form the majority of the population of Iraq whose rights should be readjusted without further delay.

Yours sincerely,

W. A. R. G.

Lieut. Colonel R. E. Wood,
Commanding, C.I.C.I.,
Baghdad.

Copy to:-

Captain V. Holt, C.M.G., R.V.O. ✓

C. J. Edwards, Esq., C.M.G., C.B.E.

+ 2410

✓ 23710

INDEX

Extract from "Combined Intelligence Centre 'Iraq
TRIBAL AND POLITICAL WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 88

46. H.M. Consul-General at TABRIZ states that Russian policy towards the Kurds is being modified. In the early summer, when the Turks seemed to them to be making threatening gestures, the Russians had but one object - to strengthen their military position and to keep the Persians weak; this they did by making much of the Kurds. Latterly they seem to have realised the need to restore order, to curb Kurdish insolence towards the Persians and put a truce to the feuds between tribes; all this they would like to do without forfeiting Kurdish friendship. UMAR (AMR) KHAN of the SHIKAK and KARA AINI of the MAMISH have tried already to give effect to this policy while HAMA RASHID's visit to MAHABAD (paragraph 45 of Summary No. 87) was an attempt to effect a reconciliation between ALI AGHA AMIR ASSAD, of the DEHBUKRI, ABDULLAH of the MANGUR and KARA AINI of the MAMISH. He had no success, nor is any permanent success to be expected for any part of the Russian plan; the methods of MUSTAPHA KEMAL and REZA SHAH are needed to bring the Kurds into step with modern times. Romantic ideas of the Kurds as sturdy, hospitable mountaineers form a false picture to-day. Rather are they lazy, diseased and dirty, thieves and liars, ready to sell anything for money and hopelessly divided among themselves. But their greatest crime is that they are setting their faces against history and, taken as a whole, they do not know it. A few of the chiefs have threatened to resign and abandon their fellows to their fate because they recognise that by their present behaviour the Kurds are missing an opportunity to show that they can use freedom, and are inviting stern reaction sooner or later.

Iran: Kurds. 152/187/42

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

PAREX

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES,

From H.M. ~~AMBASSADOR~~

To H.M. MINISTER TEHRAN.

BAGDAD.

Date 21ST OCTOBER, 1942.

No. 282

Time despatched 1140 ✓

Addressed to TEHRAN 282,
rptd to
Tabriz No. 3,
Foreign Office No. 1050.

-/183/-

Your telegram No. 399.

Story is complete fabrication.

Lyon has never been to Rezaieh but last August he and Edmonds were touring on duty in country between Rowanduz and Turkish frontier. They organised no gatherings of Kurds and certainly made no anti-Russian propaganda of the kind alleged.

2. I know of no civilian named Jackman unless Chapman is intended. He was I think in Persia near Tehran on leave on October 1st and his movements are known to you. So far as I am aware he went nowhere near Rezaieh.

= THOMPSON =

VH/GHT
BM
RK
RK

INDEX

152

Iran : Kurds

152/186/42

No.C/11/921.

POLITICAL ADVISER'S OFFICE,
NORTHERN AREA.

"SECRET".

Kirkuk, 19th October, 1942.

Dear Holt. ✓

Reference your 152/182/42 dated 12-10-1942.

There is no truth at all in the story.
The nearest I have been to Rezaieh was last
August when I went with Prichard and Edmonds
to Beri Berdi. Chapman was on leave in Persia
but his movements were all known to the British
Legation.

Neither of us would in any case make
such a statement.

Yours sincerely,



Capt. V. Holt, C.M.G. C.V.
Oriental Secretary,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

*I agree.
Col. Holt is
the nearest
of help.*

*Of course he would have helped
Col. Holt had he tried*

*Adm
PP Wright
Pleasant*

*no one with
news and 1st
TEL 2070*

INDEX

152

Iran: Kurds

152/183/42.

TELEGRAM.CYPHER
PAREX
XXXXXX

From:— H.M. MINISTER TEHRAN.

To: HM AMBASSADOR BAGDAD

Despatched 16.10.42 (1920)

Received 17.10.42 (0730)

Decyphered 17.10.42 (1215)

No. 399 of 16TH OCTOBER, 1942.

rptd to Addressed to BAGDAD NO. 399,
F.O. 1323,
Tabriz 118.

Tabriz telegram No. 154.

Can you suggest any facts which might have been distorted into this story? I should like to be able to refute it if the occasion arises. The officer whose name the Russian from time to time heard is presumably Colonel Lyon.

....

Cypher

*Wait reply to 179
before answering this?*

17/10

*Yes - but let us try to
expedite a reply. I suggest
a Telegram to Lyon & a reminder
to Mr. Edmunds.*

Fel

Iran: Kurds.

152/182/42

(152/182/42)

12th October, 1942.

Dear Lyon,

I enclose a paraphrase of a telegram from our Consul-General at Tabriz. "Jackman" presumably stands for Chapman.

I assume that the story is without foundation but before we reply in that sense to Tabriz I should be glad to have your confirmation and also, if possible, an alibi.

Yours sincerely,

W.A.

INDEX

LIEUT. COL. W.A. LYON, O.B.E.

12/4

152

Iran: Kurds 152/181/A2.

TELEGRAM.

PAREX CYPHER

~~XXXX~~

From:— Mr. Urquhart, Tabriz. To:— H.M. Ambassador,
Bagdad.

Despatched 9/10/42 17.35 hrs Received 10/10/42 17.00 hrs
Dec. " 18.00 "

No. 8 of 9th October, 1942.

Addressed to Tehran No. 154

Repeated to Foreign Office and
Bagdad.

+Spell
4.
%1 ch.

Soviet Vice-Consul in charge has questioned me about a report that a Colonel Lyon, Lane or possibly Lyall from Iraq accompanied by civilian named Jackman had a meeting at a village near Rezaieh with [+gp. undec.] Bey called Begza [qua]hs on October 1st. They are represented as wooing the Kurds, saying they could depend on Britain whereas the Russians would let them down. I should be glad to know how to reply. I have of course laughed it off as far as I dared.

*Shank
Draft
Black
VA 12/10*

CW/BJM
TU
TU

INDEX

152
Iran: Kurds 152/180/42
No.C/11/890.

"SECRET".

POLITICAL ADVISER'S OFFICE,
NORTHERN AREA.

Kirkuk, 5th Oct., 1942.

[Handwritten signature]

Dear Holt,

Reference your 152/176/42 dated 23-9-1942. As far as I can make out the Ushnu meeting seems to have been given undue importance and people coming from that area state that the Russians merely called upon the local tribal leaders to keep order each in his own area, to be true to their Russian Allies and not to export their local resources. The Mutasarriif of Arbil has also confirmed this. I will let you know at once if and when I hear anything more.

Yours sincerely,



[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

Capt. W. Holt, C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Oriental Secretary,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

INDEX

Iran : Kurds

152/179/42

(152/179/42)

5th October, 1942

Edmonds
h/c

Reference my letter No. 152/176/42 of September 26th.

2. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reports that the Military Attache has learnt that the Russian authorities have now given formal permission for a Persian brigade to be stationed at Tabriz and for one battalion from Rezaieh to go to Khoi to protect that area against the Kurds.

3. The Persian General Staff have difficulty in finding troops for Tabriz but the Soviet Military Attache has pressed for a battalion at once. The Soviet authorities now state that they have no objection to the Persians' disarming the Kurds provided there is no disturbance. The proviso, of course, renders the permission useless.

[Signature]

ASH
JM
RK

[Signature]

C.J. Edmonds Esq., C.M.G., C.B.E.

Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Lynch, O.B.E.

INDEX

Iran Kurds

152/178/42.

To be PARAPHRASED before
communication to any outside Office.

FOREIGN OFFICE

29/9/43



Repeated to ANKARA No. 98

MINSTATE No. 223 (Savings)
INDIA No. 157 (Savings)
BAGDAD No. 157 (Savings)
10th Army No. 55 (Savings)

144/218/43

59/Sub

TABRIZ telegram No. 134 to TEHRAN

M.A. learns that Soviet Authorities have now given formal permission for a Persian Brigade to be stationed at TABRIZ and for one battalion from REZAISH to go to KHOI to protect area against the Kurds.

2. Persian General Staff have difficulty in finding troops for TABRIZ but Russian M.A. pressed for a battalion at once.

3. Russian authorities now say they have no objection to Persians disarming Kurds provided there is no disturbance but the proviso renders the permission useless.

BULLARD.

File
CLSR
H/C
C
Savings.

By and per Mr. ... to Mr. Edmunds
+ Co. Lyon.
Yes
Please
10/10
5/11/42

INDEX

152 To be PARAPHRASED before *Iran: Kurds 152/177/42.*
communication to any outside Office. **SAVINGRAM**



To: **MINSTATE**

No: 213

BAGDAD

182

INDIA

148

Tenth Army

30

Date: 21/9/42

Parap. to *Q. Edmonds + Col. Lyon. Q.R. 26/9*

Following received from Tabriz No. 140 of the 18th September.
BEGINS: Addressed Foreign Office No. 49
repeated Tehran.

Situation quiet in Eastern AZERBAIJAN, but in Western AZERBAIJAN Kurdish feuds have led to incidents, notably at MAHABAD and MIANDOUAB and the Kurds' arrogance is increasing intolerably. In spite of warnings from the Russians, Jalali raided two more villages on 13th September.

2. The occasion for Ushnu meeting was the marriage of a chief's son. The Kurds say the Russians used it to make them swear:-

- (a) Fidelity to the Russians,
- (b) To loot more,
- (c) To organise themselves for mutual assistance.

No more? VJ

3. These are the conflicting trends in the Russian policy towards the Kurds, but I believe the dominant consideration now is to restore order without recourse to force, which would antagonise the Kurds and lessen the usefulness of the Red Army in case of trouble with the Turks. Two Super Chiefs have been elected, presumably in consequence of (c) in agreement with the above, and they have already made attempts to persuade the Kurds in REZAIH district to return to their villages and to compose feuds in MAHABAD district entirely without success.

4. My previous information that the Russians will reduce Jalili is wrong. The Persians are preparing to do so with Russian approval. The Russians say, with doubtful sincerity however, that they will not object to the disarming of all the Kurds.

5. Turkish frontier relations remain sound. The main danger to them at present comes from low-grade spies who continue to retail sensational reports. URQUHART. ENDS.

BULLARD.

INDEX

Iran: Kurds.

152/176/42

(152/176/42)

British Embassy,
Bagdad.

23rd September 1942.

Dear Edmonds,
Lyon,

Reference my letter no. 152/175/42 of the 19th
September.

Our Consul-General at Tabriz now reports further
as follows:-

have
"The Kurds who attended the conference here told
the Persian authorities that the Russians gave warning
that they would repress any future disturbance of public
order. The Persian Chief of Customs says that the
Russians have established a liaison post at Khanah
and he has proposed the re-opening of the Persian
Customs Post there. He also says the Russians themselves
are going to restore order in the frontier region where
the Jalili have recently caused a disturbance."

Yours sincerely,

VH
MR/MR

L.D.

24/9.



LIEUT. COL. W. A. LYON O. B. E.

C. J. EDMONDS ESQ., C. M. G., C. B. E.



59/5

SAVINGRAM

To: Minstate
India
Bagdad ✓
GOC

No. 200
138
177
26

Enli
Heard
1579



Date: 14/9/42.

Following received from TABRIZ Tel. 134 of 11th September.
BEGINS: Addressed Tehran
repeated Foreign Office.

My Tel. 133 para 3.

The Kurds who attended the conference have told the Persian authorities that the Russians gave warning that they will repress any future disturbance of public order. This welcome development, if confirmed, may be regarded as a sequel to the growth of Russian confidence regarding the Turkish frontier, reported in my Tel. 112.

2. The Chief of Customs says that the Russians have established a liaison post at KHANEH and he has proposed the ~~xxx~~ re-opening of the Persian Customs Post there.

3. He also says the Russians themselves are going to restore order in the frontier region where the Jalili have recently caused a disturbance. URQUHART. ENDS.

BULLARD.

Iran Kurds

(152/175/42)

British Embassy,
Bagdad.

19th September 1942.

Dear Lyon,
Edmonds

Tabriz report that the Russians assembled a number of Kurdish leaders at Ushnu on September 4th. Please let me know if any details of this meeting reach you from Kurdish sources.

Yours sincerely,

VH
MR/MR



Q.N.
21/9.

LIEUT. COL. W. A. LYON O. B. E.

C. J. EDMONDS ESQ., C. M. G., C. B. E.

" SUI SANG "

152/145/42

Extract from Savingram from Tehran dated 12.9.42
addressed to Minister of State no.198

India	136
Bagdad	176
Tenth Army	24.

Following received from Tabriz no.133 of 9th September.

Begins: Addressed Foreign Office no.45.
repeated Tehran no.133.

x x x x x

3. 4th September Russians assembled Kurdish leaders
at USHNU. Object not yet known.

x x x x x

BULLARD.

INDEX

156
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR,
'IRAQ.

Iran : Kurds : Situation

152/144/42
العراق

Copy as below

وزارة الداخلية

Baghdad the 1st September, 1942.
2
P.S.No. 1060.



To
H. B. M's Embassy, Baghdad (2).
C. I. C. I., Baghdad.
Political Adviser, Northern Area.

Memo.

I forward herewith some random notes on the situation in the Kurdish districts of Western Azarbaijan as gathered from Iraqi-Kurdish sources in the course of my recent tour in the Ruwandiz qadha.

2-2-2-2
There is a new...
C.I.C.I.
Tehran
Comp. dated 9 Sept.
ADVISER,
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.
VA 619
Off: 7/9

INDEX

THE SITUATION IN PERSIAN KURDISTAN
(as gathered from Iraqi- Kurdish Sources).

1. The following is a note of information collected at random from Iraqi-Kurdish sources in the course of a ride in the north-east corner of Iraq along the Persian and Turkish boundaries. It may be read as a continuation of my earlier note with the same title dated 31 May and circulated under my ^X P.S.692 of 1 June 1942. As in the preparation of that note I have not attempted to cross-check or harmonize this information with official reports, in order that their view from a completely different angle may serve to give a more stereoscopic effect to the picture of the situation based on official knowledge.

ROUTE.

2. The route followed was as follows :

Map 1 D/NE

- Aug.4. Ruwandiz to Gelala (sq.29 c) by car, thence ride to Rust (sq. 22 a)
5. Rust in Pirasini (sq. 15 b)
6. Bradest camp at Bar-i Bardi near pillar 121 (sq.11 c)
7. Lalun (sq.4 b)

Map 1 G/NE

8. Herki camp in Gader valley (sq. 23 d)
9. Dalanger (sq.23 b) & Herki camp at Milezeri (sq.23 a)
10. Herki camp at Bifimishka (sq.27 a)
11. Afi (sq. 25 d)

Map 1 G/SW

12. Kani Rash (sq.36 a)

Map 1 D/NE

13. Sidekan (sq.14 d)
14. Ser-i Hasan Beg (sq.20 b)
15. Ruwandiz (sq. 25 d)

3. The headings have been arranged for convenience in the following order : Sanj Bulaq, Urumi, Tergawar, Mergawar, Dashta Bēl, Ushun, Russian policy, the adjacent Districts of Turkey, and then Hewraman Luhun, ~~Hewraman Bazar~~, Meriwan, Bana, Kurds and Persians.
Takht

SANJ BULAQ.

(see May note paras 6 & 8)

4. Ali Agha Hajji Ilkhani, Kurdish Quisling No.2, became extremely unpopular and some weeks ago was ignominiously expelled by the townsmen; he is now in Teheran. By the invitation of the people Sowara-i-Ahmad-i-Gulawi Agha of the Mangur has succeeded to the Governorship with Mirza Ghani Khusrawi, a Kurd of Sanj Bulaq, as chief of police. Apparently at some date subsequent to his assumption of office about 50 Persian amniya entered the town with Dehbukri or Mamish help; a merchant of Sanj Bulaq who had left on about August 5th said they were still there on that date, but I was informed at Rawanduz that about August 10th the people had risen and thrown them out neck & crop.

5. By all accounts Sowar Agha is doing well and is popular; perfect order prevails; all roads are patrolled by qarasuran who escort travellers and caravans between stages for a fixed and moderate fee. His newly appointed Deputy Governors are well spoken of; at Miyandawab Majid Khan of the Badakh Khan family, a well educated young man in the thirties, has replaced Mustafa Khan Dehbukri of Shamsat; Hajji Samad Khan of GHANDAWERU is in charge at Saingala; at Herdaskht the situation is not quite clear but the scales are evidently now weighted in favour of the Mangur as against the Pishdar (see May note para 8); the expelled governor Ali Agha Hajji Ilkhani, however, retains control of his own district of Buzan.

6. Qazi Muhammad, who left Sanj Bulaq after a quarrel with Ali Agha^d accompanied Saiyid Abdullah to Teheran, (see para 11 below) is now back. He has no official post but apparently supports Sowara Agha. He is interesting himself in education and is understood to be working for the introduction of Kurdish as the language of instruction in the schools.

U.R.U.M.I.

(see May note para 7)

7. The Persian troops are said to hardly to venture outside the town; the furthest south of the amirya is Qaraqash at the road-fork to Ushnu and Sanj Bulaq. The Russian political officer is Alioff.

TERGAWAR.

8. Tergawar is largely controlled by Huri Beg of the Begnada who lives at Ambi, though Rashid Beg brother of Said Khan Herki is also influential. No Persian authority. No information regarding Russian military posts.

MERGAWAR.

9. Mergawar is largely controlled on the civil side by Mahammad Husain Khan son of Korim Khan of the Herki Sidas who lives at Larkina; his brother lives at Mergi. There is no Persian authority. There are Russian military posts (N to S) Silwana, Mergi (H.Q.), Gerana, Shakiawa, Holistan, Susinawa (nothing between this⁶ Ushnu). Quite recently they have placed mobile posts in tents to watch the roads from Turkey at Binar, Basterash (Malana) & Zinu y Mergawar (Khan), but not apparently at Kileshia y Mergawar.

10. Neither the Russians nor (of course) the Persians patrol to the Gader valley. The Herki are camped there in peace. In view of the violent protests of the Persian Government against the migration of the armed Herki (which they themselves had never stopped) to Persia earlier this year, it is worth noting that the Herki appear to have behaved admirably and that no incident has been reported.

11. Reference is invited to my memo P.S.724 of 18 June 1942 giving some account of the activities of Saiyid Abdullah. At Teheran he was successful in inducing the government to restore his properties (against a promise to pay 50 or 70 thousand tumans in fees); he then returned to Rajan, where his nephew S. Musa has been in permanent residence since the Anglo-Russian occupation. S. Abdullah has now gone to Tergawar on the mission referred to in para 15 below. It is considered in Kurdish circles that he missed a great opportunity, at the time of the occupation, of putting himself at the head of a Kurdish movement; his prestige is consequently low. Prima facie it

seems strange that a man who can go on a hostile mission of the kind on which he is now reported to be engaged should have been dependent on Persian consent to his reoccupying his properties in an area where the Persian writ does not run; but it is always well to have things in good legal order, even when the arm of the ^{law} land does not reach very far.

DASHT-A DSI.

12. The Dasht-a DSI is the small plain south-east of Mergawar and north of Ushnu. It is controlled by Taha Agha s/o Tahir Agha Herki who lives at Kani Ispi. There are no Russians or Persians.

U B H H W.

13. The Governor is Qarani Agha of the Zerna. The people have appointed ten policemen and the shopkeepers pay a corps of night watchmen. An octroi tax is taken. The Russian political officer is Abdullah-off; the Russians are said to be discouraging the export of agricultural produce, but do not seem to have taken any effective steps to stop it (wheat is still coming in via Zinn y Shaikh (Hayat) but less than previously); Qarani Agha enjoys the particular confidence of the Russians. There is no Persian authority. The Khailani nomads have gone unmolested to their traditional grazing grounds at Spirex 5 or 6 miles east of the boundary between pillars 121 & 122.

RUSSIANS AND KURDS.

14. All Iraqi tribesmen who have crossed into this part of Persia agree in testifying that they were received with the greatest courtesy by the Russians who, they say, are preventing the Persians from interfering with the Kurds in any way.

15. Pushe, son of Saiyid Taha, goes further and says that the Russians are once more pursuing an active pro-Kurdish and anti-Persian policy. On August 22, in Baghdad, he informed me that quite recently (i.e. since I stayed with Pushe at Bdsu on August 24th) Saiyid Abdullah had gone off to visit the Shikhi chiefs (Amar Khan, Sartip, Hasan Amar and Hasan Tilo) to bring them to a rendez-vous at Anbi in Tergawar, the village of Nuri Beg of the Begnada (see para 8 above), there to meet Alioff (Russian political officer Urani, see para 7) who was to bring the settled Herki chiefs of Mergawar. According to Pushe these changes

in policy, from incitement to restraint and now back to encouragement coincide with and have been due to the appointment and dismissal of Suhaili as Prime Minister; I do not know what warrant there is for this theory. Perhaps the situation in the Caucasus has stimulated Russian interest in Kurdish good-will.

THE ADJACENT TURKISH DISTRICTS.

16. In contrast to their attitude towards tribesmen from Iraq the Russians are most suspicious of persons coming from Turkey; these are arrested and interrogated, and any Turkish currency found on them is confiscated. For Russian posts and patrols on the Mergavar section of the Turke-Persian boundary see para 9 above.

17. On August 9th the Herki with whom I was camped had just received the first news of "large forces" of Turks having reached the frontier region of Diza Gavar. "Large forces" might mean anything from a battalion to an army corps, and no second witness had yet arrived for cross-check.

18. Towards Iraqis the Turks are now far less truculent than formerly, when they used to shoot at sight. Villagers and tribesmen, men and women, visit the Shamdinan district and if unarmed are not molested. Last autumn some of the Herki returned from Persia by way of Kileshin y Mergavar and the Hajji Beg valley road (which runs for the most ^{part} on the Turkish side) without interference.

19. (It appears that the Turks locally regard the stream coming down from due east to pillar No. 98 as the boundary and do not interfere with Herki sheep grazing in the enclave between it and the more southerly stream of Kialis, the principal source of the Hajji Beg river and the true boundary. Turke-Iraqi pillar 99 has been removed and replaced as the "three-power-pillar" by Turke-Persian pillar 519, a solid structure faced with dressed stone a metre square and four feet or more high).

NEWAMAN LUKH. (see May note pages 12-16)

20. Although my tour took me only to places adjacent to the Persian Kurdish districts of Anarbaijan, I heard a few echoes from the Senna province which are perhaps worth recording. In Newaman Lukh the arrangements described in my May note appear to have been carried out at any rate partially. Three monthly remittances for road guard

salaries have been received (but no rifles, naturally). Salaries and one or two additional nomination for road guards have been allotted to Hana Amin s/o Ja'far Sultan and the sons of Ahmad Beg of Hewtah (see May note para 16). This has removed a cause of internal dissension.

HEWRAMAN Y TAKHT.

(see May note para 11)

21. There has been some skirmishing between the Mustafasultanis ^{of Razan} and the Persians, due, not to any attempt by the latter to penetrate into Hewraman, but to a boundary dispute over the villages of Niyer, Miraw, Khrosa and Aliawa (about 20 miles W.N.W. of Senna on the map). Appeals have been made to the other sections and to the Lahun for help. Zuhrah Beg, son of Afrasiab Beg, who happened to be in Kirkuk when I passed through on August 17th, took the line that this aggression on the undoubted property of Kurdish land-owners of Senna constituted a breach in Kurdish solidarity and was unjustified.

MERIHAN.

22. On the other hand Mahmud Khan of Kani-Sanna, Kurdish Quisling No. 1 and double-crosser hors concours, seems to have thought the Persian position weak enough to warrant his sending a contingent under his son to support the Razawis.

KHURKHURA.

(see May note para 9)

23. Full accounts of the reasons for which the Jaf nomads who went to the Khurkhura area have returned abnormally early have not yet reached me, but it seems that a party of Persian soldiers, with a tribal umbrella provided by Sulaiman Khan Raghzadi Jaf and the Tileke, molested the Chuchan, a small tribe not Jaf but camped with them in the summer.

B.A.H.A.

(see May note para 5)

24. I met no one from this vicinity, but generally it would seem that things are much as described in my May note. The Persians have made no attempt to get back. Hana Hashid Khan still spurns office but is accepted by the Persians as the power behind the nominal governor's stool; complaints against him have ceased. Hana Hashid is said to have vetoed any molestation by the Persians of the Jaf who came to the Bana area; if so he has shown himself more successful in diplomacy than the Iraqi Ministry

- 7 -

for Foreign Affairs or the *Chargé d'Affaires* at Teheran.

KURDS AND PERSIANS.

25. When I wrote my May note it seemed that the Persians had successfully driven wedges between the various parts of Kurdistan, that all cohesion among the Kurds north of Marivan had broken down, and that the same was about to happen to the south. In the 2½ months that have elapsed there has been no further Persian infiltration; on the contrary the Kurds have consolidated their position in several places, notably in the Sanj Balaq province (but with weak joint in the Mangur-Pashdar revalry at Serdasht). This is no doubt due in ^{part} fact to the Russian hands - off policy in the north, but the perceptible if slight consolidation of the Kurdish position further south suggests that the Persians are weaker than they were.

G. J. E.

21.8.42.

To: H.M. Ambassador,
BAGHDAD

^{152/173/42}
No. 69 (222/180/42) of the 8.8.'42.
Reference: Kermanshah Tel. No. 46 to you.

152/168/42 }
With the compliments of H.M. Representative,
TEHRAN.

No. 261 (22/180/42)



8th August, 1942.

Sir,

The man who can "bring in the tribes" provided that enough money is forthcoming tends to be prominent at times like this and it is somewhat surprising that the first has only just appeared in this country. He is the Amir-i-Kull, the Governor General of Kermanshah, who is prepared to guarantee us the assistance of "all the Kurdish tribes" should the Germans invade Persia, provided that money is forthcoming for the purpose. I have asked His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah, through whom the offer was received, to convey the thanks of His Majesty's Legation to the Amir-i-Kull for his message.

2. It would be interesting if the Amir-i-Kull could discuss this matter with the present Ambassador of Turkey in London who, when in command in Kermanshah of Turkish forces during the last war, saw the German Military Attaché dealing with similar offers. According to General Orbay the Military Attaché distributed huge sums in gold to Kurdish chieftains and then committed suicide when, on the approach of the Russians, the Kurds naturally did nothing whatever to oppose them.

Copied to His Majesty's Minister of State, His Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad and H.M. Consul at Kermanshah.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

(Sgd.) R. W. BULLARD.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden,
P.C., M.C., M.P., etc.,
THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

*Para 2 contains a moral
for us all*

10/17/42

Yes, indeed

16/8

INDEX

~~Col. J. H. L.~~
The 1st of June is now optimistic

to-day about the wheat question.
Action is a little discouraged in

Chicago resulted in configuration
of a stock of wheat, & a price of
1.5.500 — which, he said, has
made the merchants sit up.

He also told me that he
intends to make the big people
disappear but as he has no power
in money that, I am afraid,
does not mean much.

In general he thought the prospect
of selling the wheat out — more
favorable than it was a week
ago.
L
21.7

$$152/172/42$$

Copie a TERNAN O KERNAN H (+)
FVA COL MATHIAS

and a number of followers of the Begzadas as salaried Amniyah.
Further concessions said to have been given include :-

1. Salaries to be paid to Begsadahs.
2. Agha Salih Ranka Raizan to receive a salary and to be given some villages.
3. Salih Khan Sulaiman Khan Mishyarda to be "governor" of Kherkhora, with a salary and a force of salaried Amniyeh from his followers.

Arms for the Amniyeh to be recruited will not be provided by the Persian Government.

2. Persian Amniyeh have arrived at Kherkhora to collect pasture tax from the immigrating Jaf and Mahmud Khan Kani. Senan is stated to have collected men to assist them should the Jaf resist.

3. There has been some trouble near Sennah where one Hassan Khan Ridhaw came into conflict with a detachment of troops in which some of the latter were killed. It is stated that AVROMAN tribes will assist Hassan Khan and that a force of Disli under Abdullah Khan s/o Mahmud Khan Disli and Ali Khan Wala Zair will go to the assistance of Hassan Khan Ridhaw should the Persians undertake punitive action.

4. The Persian Government is urging people of the frontier areas, by all the means in its power, not to export wheat, barley and ghee to Iraq.

5. Mulla Rahim the clerk of Hama Rashid Khan Waina, has deserted him and joined Mahmud Khan Kani Senan to whom he stated that Hama Rashid Khan intends to attack him at the first opportunity.

T.A/1779/23

C.I.D. Baghdad.
30.7.1942.

Dear Sir

The above translation of a "Special Report" issued by the Director, C.I.D. to-day is forwarded for favour of information.

Yours sincerely,

C.J. Edwards, Esq, CMG., CBE.,
Adviser, Ministry of Interior.

Capt.V.Holt, CMG., MVO.,
H.B.M.'s Embassy, Baghdad.

C.I.C.I. Baghdad. (2)

Lt.Col.C.G.Aston, OBE.,
P.A.Central Area, Baghdad.

Lt.Col.W.A.Iyon, OBE.,
P.A.Northern Area, Kirkuk.

Major H.M.Cones, OBE.,
Chief Inspector of Const. Baghdad.

Major A.Kinch,
A.P.A. Mosul.

Capt.C.E.Corry, MBE.,
Insp.of Constabulary, Mosul.



Shan: Kurds
INT.SIT. KURDISTAN

152/171/22
22/179/42



COPY OF A TELEGRAM

No: 69 (XXX)

To: KERMANSHAH
Date: 1/8/43

Repeated Bagdad No.148 SAVING

Your Tel. 107.

152/171/22
You should merely convey Legation's
thanks to Amir-i-KULL for his offer.

BULLARD.

File
Calr
H/C
C

+ *VH* 18/8

INDEX

152

Iran : Kurds

152/170/42

No. C/11/655.



POLITICAL ADVISER'S OFFICE,
NORTHERN AREA.

Kirkuk, 1st August, 1942.

"SECRET".

Dear Holt.

I forward herewith, in original, Political Adviser Kermanshah's 13A/PA of 21st and 23rd July. I have not been honoured by copies of these letters before and I do not see any addressed to you or C.I.C.I. It seems as if there was some alteration in Fletcher's outlook and procedure and the whole picture looks rather a mixed sort of Harlequinade with the Persians trying to provoke more trouble. So far as my information goes there is nothing fresh to report.

The Persians, as before, are pro-Nazi. The Kurds are anti-Persian, friendly to the British and pro themselves. Ali Ilkhani and Mahmud Khan Kani Sonan are regarded by the Kurds as quislings. The latter being a pet enemy of Ali Khan of Walazher. Hama Rashid Khan is quiescent and occupied with his new bride. When Mahmud Khan sent his agent to me about a fortnight ago I told him I could not advise him on his affairs in Persia but I advised him to get on good terms with the Iraqi authorities as a good insurance policy for the future whatever it might be.

Meanwhile I think the liaison with the Persian Kurds could be improved with profit to our war effort and Persian intrigues curbed when they seem likely to cause avoidable lawlessness as in the case of their recent ultimatums to the Jaf.

*Yours sincerely
A. L. G.*

Capt: V. Holt, C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Oriental Secretary,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

Enc: 2.

Copy to:

- : C.J. Edmonds Esq., C.M.G., C.B.E., Baghdad.
- : Lt. Col: E.K. Wood, C.I.C.I., Baghdad.

I have given copies to C.I.C.I. V.H.

INDEXED

*10/8
11/8
12/8
13/8
14/8
15/8
16/8
17/8
18/8
19/8
20/8
21/8
22/8
23/8
24/8
25/8
26/8
27/8
28/8
29/8
30/8
31/8
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*This is mostly either
out of date or
unreliable. V.H. 1878*

SECRET

No. 13A/PA.
KERMANSHAH.
23rd July 1942.

To:-

Brigadier, General Staff,
Hq Xth Army,
BAGDAD. (2)

From:-

Political Adviser,
KERMANSHAH.

Subject:-

KURDISTAN.

Reference para 6 of my letter 13A/PA of the 21st July. Since writing the letter referred to above I have had long conversations with Persian officers, who have lately been serving in KURDISTAN, and whose opinion is, I consider, worth considering. They stated that there was now a certain amount of pro-German propaganda among the Kurds in the neighbourhood of SAKIZ and that this was due to their contacts with Persian officers and - to a less degree - soldiers, who were all thoroughly pro-German and convinced of a German victory. Now that HAMA RASHID had submitted news of German victories and talk of German invincibility was bound to spread among Kurdish leaders in contact with Persian officers. In fact the Persian garrison at SAKIZ is, in effect, a good enemy propaganda centre for KURDISTAN.

2.

In order not to arouse Persian suspicion we have so far not attempted to counter this kind of indirect propaganda by contacting Kurdish leaders except through our occasional patrols whose officers are forbidden to talk politics with Kurdish leaders. If the Persians have not by now realised that we are not helping the Kurds nothing we can say or do will ever convince them, and I suggest that it might be advisable to make an effort to prevent the Kurds round BANEH and SAKIZ from being influenced against us and in favour of our enemies. Much would I think be done from the IRAQ side. Brigadier ARFAA, who is commanding the Persian Division consisting of the SAKIZ, SENANDAJ and KERMANSHAH brigades and whose permanent H.Q. are at SENANDAJ (not KERMANSHAH as recently reported in a Xth Army Intelligence Summary), and who is pro-German, is shortly to be moved. If an officer friendly to us is appointed in his place it may help matters. I suggest also that the Persian Government might be informed of this kind of indirect propaganda and be told that, as their army officers seem to pay no attention to any orders about propaganda against the allies, we shall have to take our own measures and send our own people to counter the effect by contacting Kurdish leaders. It was at the same time proposed that a Kurdish speaking officer should be appointed as A.L.O. SENANDAJ and, if such an appointment is made, more information will be available about KURDISTAN and he might be able to put out counter-propaganda.

P. H. H. H.

Lt Colonel,
Political Adviser.

Copy to:-

H.B.M. Consul,
KERMANSHAH. (2)

British Military Attache,
TEHRAN.

Hq 31 Ind Div.
KMS.

Lt Col LYON,
Political Adviser,
North IRAQ.

SECRET.

No.13A/PA.
KERMANSHAH.
21st July 1942.

To:-

Brigadier General Staff,
Hq Xth Army,
BAGDAD. (2)

From:-

Political Adviser,
KERMANSHAH.

Subject:-

K U R D I S T A N .

It is very difficult to ascertain the nature of the settlement said to have been reached with HAMA RASHID at BANEH. In SENANDAJ on the 15th July the Farmandar stated that HAMA RASHID had been made bakshdar of BANEH and had received a present of money from the Persian military authorities. Major MAJIDI, Chief of Staff of the 10th Division, told me that HAMA RASHID had no official position but was, in effect, head of the area round BANEH. Yesterday General SHAHBAKTI most emphatically denied that HAMA RASHID had been made bakshdar. He said that SALIM KIVARUD was bakshdar, that HAMA RASHID had submitted, that his son and brother were now with Colonel ARFAA in SAKIZ, and that 4,000 Tomans had been taken by 3 Persian officers to BANEH for the relief of those who had suffered in the recent disturbances. SHAHBAKTI further stated that ALI KHAN VILAJIRI of MARIVAN had been to see HAMA RASHID and had cursed him for submitting. ALI KHAN said the Germans would soon arrive and, when that happened, the Kurds would be able to kill all the Persians and capture SENANDAJ. The Farmandar of SENANDAJ told me that he had received reports to the effect that MAHMUD KHAN of HANI SANAN, who was installed by the Persians as bakshdar of MARIVAN, and has ever since been playing a double game, was telling other Kurdish leaders that he was playing up to the British and telling them he wanted to get a British passport. MAHMUD KHAN was explaining that this was only bluff and that, if the Germans should approach PERSIA, the Kurds should side with them and attack and kill both the Persians and the British. In this connection para 2(a) of Intelligence Summary No. 20 dated the 22nd June 1942 from Hq 26th Ind Inf Gp is interesting. The para in question runs as follows:-

"A report has been received from a source outside this Brigade that MAHMUD KHAN of KANISANAN is a worried and frightened man.....MAHMUD KHAN has stated with engaging naivete that he intends to ask Lt Colonel LYON, P.A., Northern IRAQ for a British passport so that, if his worst fears are realised, he can emigrate to LONDON".

2. Yesterday SHAHBAKTI told me he had reports that the Iraqi authorities are inciting SHEKH MAHMUD to come to PERSIA and incite the Kurds against the Persians, that they are also encouraging the Jaf tribe to go to PERSIA in order to prepare the ground for the arrival of SHEKH MAHMUD, and that it is said in IRAQ that JAFFAR SULTAN will shortly be allowed to return to PERSIA. SHAHBAKTI'S intelligence seems to be pretty inaccurate if it is all on a par with a report he told me he had had that, on my recent visit to SENANDAJ, SHEKH MAHMUD and his son came from MARIVAN to see me. The son was dressed in the uniform of a British Colonel and they met me at our camp in SENANDAJ. SHAHBAKTI did not believe this report, I'm glad to say, and laughed a lot when I said that the colonel was a real British one and was the O.C. of the regiment to which our detachment in SENANDAJ belonged.

3. SHAHBAKTI told me that ALI ILKHANI ZADEH, AMIR ASSAD has lately been to BANEH. In his opinion AMIR ASSAD is probably canvassing for support against KARANNI AGHA of the MAMISH, who has recently been trying to get AMIR ASSAD removed from his post of Farmandar of MAHABAD. According to SHAHBAKTI it has been put into KARANNI AGHA'S head by other Kurds that it is not fitting for a chief of his standing to be subordinate to AMIR ASSAD. KARANNI AGHA is agitating for an appointment as a Farmandar at SARDASHT independent of MAHABAD.

4. HASSAN KHAN RIZABI of RIZAB near AVROMAN has recently taken possession of a number of villages in the neighbourhood of AVI-HANG, south of TIZ TIZ on the SENANDAJ - MARIVAN road. When I was in SENANDAJ on the 15th and 16th July Colonel ALP, commanding the SENANDAJ Brigade, had just returned from AVIHANG, where he had gone to post a force of 400 men and 2 guns. He said that on his arrival HASSAN KHAN had withdrawn his men from most of the villages occupied. Prior to his arrival there had been some clashes between HASSAN KHAN'S men and some of the villagers, who had been given arms by the authorities for their protection. Yesterday SHAHBAKTI said he was sending up a battalion (i.e. gurdan) from KERMANSHAH as reinforcements for the force at AVIHANG.

5. Troops from TEHRAN are now arriving in SENANDAJ to relieve troops already in KURDISTAN. I was told that so far 2 battalions (i.e. gurdans) had arrived.

6. This is the first time reports have been received indicating that some of the Kurds might join the Germans should the war spread to this country. As it is ~~not possible~~ for any contact to be made from this side in order to persuade these Kurds that their interests are entirely opposed to those of the Germans, I suggest that, if possible, efforts should be made through Kurdish leaders in IRAQ to persuade MAHMUD KHAN and others that to link their fortunes with the Germans, should the war spread to this country, can only end in disaster to themselves.

C. Fletcher
Lt Colonel,
Political Adviser.

Copy to:-

H.B.M. Consul,
KERMANSHAH. (2).

British Military Attache,
TEHRAN.

Hq 31 Armd Div,
FIELD.

Hq 21 Ind Corps,
KRS.

Lt Colonel LYON,
Political Adviser,
NORTHERN IRAQ.



Iran: Kurds 152/169/42.

T.A./1733/80

Amir al-Sulayman

C.I.D. Baghdad.
23.7.1942.

Adviser, Ministry of Interior.
C.I.C.I. Baghdad.
British Embassy.

1. Re. the lack of news from Persian Kurdistan.
Curiously enough Frontier A.C.Ps and S.H.Os comment on similar lines but add that the tribes are getting restless again.
2. Hama Haran Terkhani has taken presents to Sarhang Arfa'.
3. Hama Rashid Khan Waina has settled down to a honey moon with a daughter of Ahmed Beg Sardawa, of Banah, but he and the Begsadehs are getting restless regarding the negative attitude of the Persian Government towards a settlement of "the peace terms".

1/1/42
25.7.
25/7
25/7
25/7
25/7

Amir al-Sulayman
23.7.42
Technical Adviser

INDEX

Amir al-Sulayman
25/7

152

Iran: Kurds

152/168/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

From : H.M. CONSUL
KERMANSHAH

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD,

PARAP

Copies to : X G.O.C.
X A.O.C.
X G.I.C.I.

Despatched : 22.7. 1000
Received : 23.7. 0730
Decyphered : 23.7. 1240

*Sent
23/7*

No. 46

of 21st July, 1942.

Addressed to TEHRAN No.107

Rptd. Bagdad No. 46.

Secret. Amir I. Kull obviously with an eye on Russian situation states that he guarantees to bring in all Kurdish tribes in Iran on our side to assist in case of German invasion of this country, provided that we make up our minds immediately in the matter and provided money repeat money is forthcoming for the purpose.

Most Secret. He says that he is confident that General Shahbakti (whom we are not so sure about) would also come in on our side in case of need. This however he asked should be kept in the background at present and not made use of.

JAM/JC
JB
RK

H.E. 24-7
Enola 21/7
Boys 24/7
VH 23/7

INDEX

Iran: Kurds. 152/167/42

TELEGRAM.

How Sent

PARAP

Copies

Sent To:

PARAP To
LYON

EDMONDS
(See 152/166/42)

From: H. M. AMBASSADOR.
BAGDAD.

To: H.M. MINISTER, TEHRAN.

Date 23rd July, 1942.

Time Despatched 23.7. ✓ 2220

No. 194

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 194.

Rptd. Foreign Office No. 756
Kermanshah No. 20.

Your telegram No. 258.

From Sulaimani it is reported that Jaf representatives have visited Amini with presents. Latter said that tribe would have to pay grazing fees to Persian agent for the area i.e. Mahmud Khan Kani Sanan. It therefore seems likely that Persian Government have adopted advice of Minister of War mentioned in your paragraph 2.

CORNWALLIS

VH/KC
CW/JAM
JB
RK

INDEX